TY - UNPB
T1 - Overpayment, Financial Distress, and Investor Horizons
AU - Andriosopoulos, Dimitris
AU - De Cesari, Amedeo
AU - Stathopoulos, Konstantinos
PY - 2016/1/12
Y1 - 2016/1/12
N2 - Firms that follow excessive payout policies (over-payers) have significantly higher financial distress risk and lower survival compared to under-payers, consistent with risk-shifting from shareholders to creditors in distressed firms. All else equal, the presence of institutional investors with long-term investment horizons in a firm is associated with overpayment. A transition analysis indicates the existence of a reciprocal relation between overpayment and financial distress, highlighting the feedback effects between overpayment and distress. In addition, over-payers endure smaller future sales and assets growth, and experience a significant future increase in the overall riskiness of their assets, compared to under-payers.
AB - Firms that follow excessive payout policies (over-payers) have significantly higher financial distress risk and lower survival compared to under-payers, consistent with risk-shifting from shareholders to creditors in distressed firms. All else equal, the presence of institutional investors with long-term investment horizons in a firm is associated with overpayment. A transition analysis indicates the existence of a reciprocal relation between overpayment and financial distress, highlighting the feedback effects between overpayment and distress. In addition, over-payers endure smaller future sales and assets growth, and experience a significant future increase in the overall riskiness of their assets, compared to under-payers.
KW - payout policy
KW - financial distress
KW - firm survival
KW - institutional investor
KW - over-payers
KW - corporate governance
UR - http://ssrn.com/abstract=2728942
M3 - Working paper
BT - Overpayment, Financial Distress, and Investor Horizons
CY - Glasgow
ER -